We consider the problem of auction design with agents that have interdependent values, i.e. values that depend on each others' private signals. We adopt the contingent bids model of Dasgupta and Maskin [3], and allow agents to submit bids of the form "if player 1 bids $x for good ¡ then I will bid $y." Our main contribution is to identify a specific linear valuation model for which there exists an efficient auction for a single item, and then extend this to provide an approximately efficient combinatorial auction with single-minded bidders. In both auction, winners and payments are computed from the fixed point of the valuation mapping defined by contingent bids. We also adopt search in order to construct a variation on the singleitem auction with improved revenue. In closing, we discuss the (many) challenges in moving to more general models of interdependent valuations.
INTRODUCTION
We consider the problem of auction design with agents that have interdependent values. In this setting, the value of an allocation can depend on the private signals of the other agents.
Allocation problems with interdependent values often arise in auction settings. Consider, for example, the sale of a case of vintage wine to a group of buyers with distributed information about the actual quality (and thus value) of the wine. Some of the bidders may have tasted similar wines, some may have read reviews, while still others may be complete novices. Interdependent values can also arise when a bidder's value for an allocation depends on the details of the allocation of goods to other bidders, and thus its value depends (indirectly) on the values of other bidders. Consider an auction for wireless spectrum. A wireless company might assign more value to some bundle of licenses if non-competing companies (e.g. with different business models) win the remaining licenses.
Visiting from Nagoya Institute of Technology, Japan Permission to make digital or hard copies of all or part of this work for personal or classroom use is granted without fee provided that copies are not made or distributed for profit or commercial advantage and that copies bear this notice and the full citation on the first page. To copy otherwise, to republish, to post on servers or to redistribute to lists, requires prior specific permission and/or a fee. In addition to settings of electronic commerce, we believe that interdependent value models will be useful for many coordination problems in multiagent systems. Consider, for example decision making about resource allocation on computational grids, for instance in allowing a team of scientists to evaluate their value for receiving the right to be the first to work with a new data set. Accurately determining this value may require aggregating the private information of a number of different teams.
The design of efficient (and optimal) auctions with interdependent values has received some attention in the economic theory literature. In particular, under the assumption that the private information (signal) of a bidder can be captured by a single number (in combination with monotonicity requirements that prevent arbitrary information from being encoded in this number), then there exist ex post efficient auctions [10] . For more general models with multi-dimensional signals there are strong negative results about the ability to implement efficient outcomes (or even much at all!) in an equilibrium [3, 8] .
We too will work within the one-dimensional signal model. Specifically, we follow Dasgupta and Maskin [3] , but depart from the other literature on interdependent value models, by working with contingent bids. As we discuss in the next section, the alternative is to work in a direct revelation framework, but this appears much more cumbersome for bidders. With contingent bids, a bidder can state information such as "my bid value is $x when bidder 2's value is $y." Bidders do not need to describe either their own signal to the mechanism, nor the domain of signals for the other bidders. We agree with Dasgupta and Maskin that this seems very difficult. In our wine example, all bidders would have to agree with the auctioneer on a language to talk about the quality of wine. In our grid computing example, all research groups would have to agree on a common language to discuss the potential value of some new data. In this aspect, our focus on contingent bids differentiates this work from the earlier work in distributed AI of Dash et al. [4] and Ito et al. [5, 7] , who consider direct revelation mechanisms.
We adopt contingent bids as first-order representations of agents' private valuation models. Our main contribution is to provide a specific instantiation of Dasgupta and Maskin's [3] contingent bid model. In particular, we define a linear contingent-bid language and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for bids to satisfy the technical conditions required for the existence of an efficient auction. We first introduce this for the single item allocation problem and later extend the language to allow for combinatorial auctions with single minded bidders. A single minded bidder is interested in just one particular bundle of goods.
In pursuit of an auction with improved revenue properties, for instance of importance to a seller of vintage wine, we then generalize the auction to include a "dummy" agent that represents the interest of the seller and submits a bid to increase competition and also to have the effect of setting a reservation price. Following the ideas introduced in Likhodedov and Sandholm [12, 13] we then use search to identify an auction with better revenue properties within this class of generalized auctions. Unlike the existing theory on optimal auctions with interdependent values [2] , in which interim individual rationality (IR) is provided, 1 our auctions have the more reasonable property of ex post IR. This means that an agent will never pay more than its value for an allocation.
In closing, we discuss the many challenges in moving towards more general models of interdependent valuations. Even within the setting of one-dimensional signals we identify a significant practical problem in extending multi-unit auctions to allow for more than single-minded bidders. The problem relates to the amount of information that bidders are required to report to an auction about the possible valuations of other bidders.
Related Work
Dash et al. [4] define a multi-item variant on the efficient, directrevelation mechanism for multiple identical items in Krishna [10] . Unlike the model of Dasgupta and Maskin [3] (DM), which we adopt in this paper, the model of Dash et al. requires that the mechanism knows the valuation function and signal domains of each bidder. Bidders report their signal and the mechanism determines the outcome and payments. Ito and colleagues [5, 6, 7] also study a model with one-dimensional signals in the context of a multiitem allocation problem. Unlike Dash et al. [4] , their mechanisms do not need to know the valuation functions of agents. However, they remain direct revelation schemes, in that agents bid both valuation functions and signals. Again, the language for describing an agent's signal must be common knowledge to all agents and the mechanism. Ito and colleagues assumed special structure to the problem, namely that the interdependency is acyclic: there are "experts" whose signal affect the values of the other agents ("amateurs"). The experts' values are unaffected by the signal of any amateur and no amateur's signal affects the value of any other amateur. This allows for positive results in their model, which is otherwise quite general.
Jehiel et al. [9] and earlier Jehiel and Moldovanu [8] , provide strong limits on ex post Nash implementation with interdependent valuations. When signals are multi-dimensional then efficiency is generally impossible, and it can be the case that no interesting social choice function can be implemented. Although, see Bikhchandani [1] for a discussion of when this negative result breaks down (and implementation is again possible.) In grid computing, an example of a multi-dimensional signal is when an agent has two signals, one relates to the novelty of the data set and one relates to the noise in the data set. One cannot combine these into one dimension while retaining properties such as increasing value with signal, also required for ex post implementation. Multidimensional signals present a new challenge, unseen in private value settings, because there are typically multiple signal values that correspond to the same value on some bundle of goods and no good way to provide incentives for an agent to report the correct pair of signals. Reports of the correct pair of signals are important to allow other 1 Cremer and McLean [2] show that if there is even a small amount of correlation between agent signals then the seller can extract all of the surplus from the participants. However, this requires interim IR. We are not aware of any revenue optimality results for the more reasonable requirement of ex post IR. agents to learn their correct value.
Finally, work on two-stage mechanisms [16] and other ascending price designs (see Krishna [10] ) also shares the concern of DM for limiting the knowledge required of the mechanism and agents. We are not aware of previous attempts to instantiate the contingent bid model of DM, as we do in this paper.
PRELIMINARIES
Consider a single item problem. Each agent from some signal space "
. The value 
and then charges the agent
The auction is efficient if valuations satisfy monotonicity,
and the single-crossing condition (SCC),
for all such that . Then SCC implies that for all signals less than that which defines C E agent is not a winner, and for all signals greater agent is the winner.) By reporting its true signal, the agent maximizes its utility with respect to a price that is independent of its own report. This is an ex post Nash equilibrium (but not dominant strategy equilibrium). Truthful reporting is only best-response when the other agents are also truthful (but whatever their true signals), because the reports of the other agents are required for agent 's true value to be correctly determined.
This auction reduces to the Vickrey auction for private value models. Yet, there is a practical problem with this protocol. As argued by DM, the auctioneer must know the signal space of agents (in order to define an expressive language for signals), and also the . Agent is said to bid truthfully when f ¢ corresponds to interdependent valuations
given signals, i.e.
Each agent submits a contingent bid, so that its value in the valuation equilibrium is equal to its true value given the signal information D E
that is implicit in the fixed-point values of the other agents. When all agents bid truthfully the fixed point .
2. Allocate the item to the agent with the maximal fixed-point value, breaking ties at random.
3. For the winner, agent , compute payment
, denoting the fixed-point valuations to other agents when agent 's bid is adjusted to some value f h . The payment to the winner is computed as the minimal (noncontingent) value that the winner could have submitted and still remained the winner.
THEOREM 2. [3] The contingent-bid auction is efficient (in an ex post Nash equilibrium) when valuations satisfy monotonicity and SCC, and when the fixed point of the mapping defined by contingent bids is unique.
The proof follows (modulo technicalities about the uniqueness of fixed points) from the structure of the proof of Theorem 1. Agents will bid truthfully in equilibrium.
Contingent bids make interdependent value auctions practical. The mechanism does not need to know the signal spaces or valuation functions of agents. On the other hand, DM note that the bidders must now have knowledge of each others' valuation functions to be able to deduce implicit signal information in the valuation equilibrium. 3 We adopt a different view on this issue. Let us simply consider the contingent-value model as the underlying model of value interdependency. With this view point, the contingent bid model requires an agent to know enough about other agents (and that this is known by other agents and so on ad infinitum) to define its value contingent on their values.
A LINEAR VALUATION MODEL
An actual instantiation of the contingent-bid auction requires a concrete bidding language, designed so that bids submitted in the language define a mapping (Eq. 4) with a unique fixed point, and so that valuations at this fixed point satisfy monotonicity and SCC. In this paper we adopt a linear bidding language, 
In Eq. (7), company 
Namely, o f mapping Eq. (4). In this case, the fixed point can be found by solving:
. Because at the fixed point, company has the maximum value it is the winner. Its payment is computed as
(i.e. the updated fixed point values for the other companies when 2's bid is
, and so 
Establishing Technical Conditions
Given the linear bidding language we must show the uniqueness of a fixed point, and then also monotonicity and SCC. First, we prove conditions on weights t for which the fixed point of the
is unique. For this we adopt Banach's Fixed Point Theorem (see Vohra [17] ).
THEOREM 3 (BANACH'S FIXED POINT THEOREM). (BFPT) Let
be a complete metric space 4 and let 
, where
. Consider any agent . We will establish are non-negative.
THEOREM 4. The contingent-bid auction defined with the linear contingent-bid language is efficient (in an ex post Nash equilibrium) when the language is expressive.
By "expressive", we mean that a bidder should be able to use the language to define a bid value that is equal to its true value, whatever the values of the other bidders. The proof follows from Lemmas 1 and 2, together with Theorem 2. Informally, once uniqueness is ensured so that the auction is well defined, fix the bids
. Agent faces an agent-independent price, defined in terms of the smallest uncontingent bid
at which it would win in the valuation equilibrium, given bids d r D w . Then, by SCC and monotonicity, and assuming the other agents are bidding truthfully, the agent will win (and make this payment) when it bids truthfully whenever its true value is greater than this price and not otherwise. Realize that an agent cannot gain by misstating either its stand-alone value f or its -weights.
TOWARDS REVENUE OPTIMALITY
We can consider a family of modified interdependent value auctions to find an auction with improved revenue. Following the direction set by Likhodedov and Sandholm [12] (in private value combinatorial auctions), we introduce a "dummy agent" (indexed zero) to represent the seller and then modify the winnerdetermination problem by defining static weights
to indicate whether the dummy agent receives the item and the item goes unsold, and 
). This value, at which would be just about to stop winning, is the payment.
Clearly, this auction reduces to the standard auction when the weights are symmetric and f 2 0
. From Myerson's [15] work on optimal auctions, we should expect weights that bias in favor of agents that are a priori less competitive. It should also be fairly clear that the auction remains truthful. One needs to show that the price to the winner is still independent of its bid, and that the winner wins when its fixed point valuation is above the price, and only then. (The proof is omitted in the interest of space.)
In our experiments, we consider a symmetric environment with the signal for each agent
, and an asymmetric environment with the signal for agent is sampled from distribution . This has the effect of making the expected signal value of agents increase with the index of the agent in the asymmetric environment. Then, for each agent we determine the -weights that define the contingent valuations as follows:
(1) Each . The effect is to cause the expected total weight assigned to the values of other agents to increase with the index of the agent. . Because our problem was quite small and because our goal was to get an initial understanding of whether revenue can be improved in interdependent value auctions we simply enumerate all grid points and select the optimal auction parameters. Future work will explore local search and other approximation methods, as in Likhodedov and Sandholm [13] .
To evaluate a parameterization, we average over 4000 instances for the symmetric environment and 5000 instances for the asymmetric environment. We compare the average revenue and efficiency in the optimized auctions with the revenue and efficiency of the standard contingent bid auctions. Figure 1 illustrates the average efficiency of the optimal auction, i.e. the average ratio of total value in the optimal auction to the maximal value (achieved in the standard auction), for different numbers of agents. Figure 2 illustrates the average normalized revenue of the optimal auction, i.e. the average ratio of total revenue in the optimal auction to the total revenue in the efficient auction, for different numbers of agents. As expected, we see that the auctions can be optimized for revenue, although at some loss in efficiency and with the benefit quickly dropping off as the number of agents increases to 5 or more. In addition, for our distributions, the possible benefit is greater in the asymmetric setting than in the symmetric setting.
Looking at the optimal parameters, the optimal revenue was achieved in the symmetric environment with symmetric weights. For the asymmetric environment, the optimal weights were sometimes asymmetric, for instance when there are 3 agents the optimal weight assignment was 0 V ©# for agent 1, 0 y © for agent 2, and 0 y © for agent 3. Moreover, optimal weights were always decreasing with agents as we expected from Myerson's [15] study of asymmetric private value auctions. This suggests that for local search it would be useful to restrict the search space to only allow states with weights that are (weakly) decreasing with agent index. The optimal choice for f in the asymmetric environment varied from 50 to 110, and averaged around 80.
SINGLE-MINDED CAS
Many interesting auction scenarios have multiple items and inter-dependent values. For instance, consider selling a mix of different bottles and allowing bidders to put together there own "cases" of wine. By adopting single-minded bidders, interested in a particular bundle of goods, we consider the simplest possible model of interdependent value CAs. Agents have two-dimensional, consisting of the description of the bundle in which it is interested and its signal, conveying information about the value of its bundle (and perhaps about the value of other agents for other bundles.) We construct an approximately efficient auction, which satisfies a generalization of the single-crossing condition.
Extending the Contingent-Bid Language
Let denote the set of goods. A single-minded bidder has an interesting bundle ¡ £ ¢ ¤ and an interdependent valuation function
Here, we assume free-disposal, so that an agent's value is (weakly) increasing with additional goods. Function, . Taken together, this defines the following contingent bid function:
We follow the earlier notation: for all agents, this has the effect of removing any dependence on bundles of this kind. Given this simplification, the fixed point can be characterized as the fixed point to the system of equations
which have exactly the same form as for the single-item contingent bid model because the same bundle Q ¡ appears for agent in all equations. Thus, there is a unique solution.
Failure of Generalized SCC
It is tempting to generalize the efficient auction described for the single item case as follows: (1) 
, and For truthful bidding to be an ex post Nash equilibrium in this auction, it would be sufficient for the valuations to satisfy a generalized form of the monotonicity and single-crossing conditions, 5 which combine as: 
In words, generalized SCC requires that the value of agent for ¥ is improving more quickly than for ¥ h with respect to its signal whenever this is true for the economy of agents in aggregate, and vice versa. Conceptually, this will be true when the marginal effect of an agent's signal on its own value dominates the marginal effect of its signal on the aggregate economy. For private value single-minded CAs, this auction is equivalent to the VCG mechanism and truthful bidding is a dominant strategy equilibrium. But, we will show that generalized SCC, and thus incentive compatibility, fails in our interdependent value model. Consider Eq. 
9
. We see that generalized SCC requires that whenever an allocation in which agent wins and an allocation in which agent loses are tied for total value, then if a change in agent 's signal changes the allocation it must be that an increase in its signal causes the allocation in which the agent is the winner to be selected. 
, and . To compute the payment by agent 1, we solve (by Eq. 19)
, and ; it would win and make a payment of 3. Failure of generalized SCC occurs in this example because agent 1's value does not affect the value of the other agent (agent 2) with which it must form a winning coalition. On the other hand, its value affects the value of both agents 4 and 5 in the competing coalition.
A Truthful Single-Minded CA
We can instead define an approximately efficient auction using a greedy allocation rule, which is parameterized with some constant 0
. The auction generalizes the auction proposed in Lehmann et al. [11] for single-minded bidders and private values to the setting of interdependent values. 6 It also reduces to our single-item auction when all agents bid on bundles with overlapping goods, so that only one agent can win. The auction is defined as follows: 1. Compute fixed point values % G f
